This study examines the internal process that led combatant groups in Northern Ireland, focusing on the Loyalist camp, to relinquish armed struggle as a viable strategy to accomplish their political goals.
In 2007, the three main Loyalist militant groups in Northern Ireland-the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), the Ulster Defence Association (UDA), and the Red Hand Commando (RHC) -announced their transformation from military to civilian/political organizations. They all subsequently handed over the vast majority of their weapons.
The issue of how militant organisations shed their violent ways and adopt a constructive civilian role within their communities is a crucial one and intimately related to the relatively under-explored topic of how to conduct internal negotiations within, rather than between, communities.
Indeed, whilst a large part of the negotiation and conflict resolution literature focuses on the content and process of negotiations between "warring parties," less attention has been generally devoted to understanding the processes of consultation and consensus-building within a given side. Yet, these internal processes are just as vital as the official ones taking place between warring parties (Lilja 2012 ).
The lack of solid backing from a leader's constituency in general and in this case, from the combatant community, can jeopardise and ultimately kill a peace process before, during, and after interparty negotiations. Firstly, sitting at the negotiating table without such coordination and support substantially increases the chances of these actors deciding to intervene to sabotage the political process.
Secondly, when militant members are alienated from their leadership, this can result in defections to more radical groups or in the creation of irredentist splinter groups. Such factionalism is extremely dangerous as internal disagreement is not at all synonymous with the decline in the use of violence as a strategy, and -as aptly explained by Martha Crenshaw-"splits and merger are a form of propagation of terrorism" (Crenshaw 1991: 80-1) .
Thirdly, when a given organisation sits at the negotiating table against the wishes of its own constituency and combatants, it finds itself more restricted in its capacity to make significant concessions, as 'giving in' would risk igniting additional internal conflict and further weaken the group's cohesion and status (Moore et al, 2013) .
Finally, lack of intra-group consensus complicates efforts to implement any peace agreement, while also making such arrangements more fragile and less likely to endure.
Therefore, for broader inter-party peace negotiations to succeed, it is absolutely vital for the main actors involved, both at the state and non-state level, to look inwardly and to invest on building consensus internally and within the broader communities that support them. Consensus-building is by no means a one-time trick; it is instead a relational and dynamic process that requires constant interaction between the leadership and the supporting bases as well as a strategic and long-term approach.
Looking at the Northern Ireland conflict, the post-agreement consensus-building process for non-violence and disarmament was just as crucial (if not more) as the pre-1998 mobilisation to support official peace negotiations, given its aim-to embed a permanent nonviolent strategy and to transform the role of combatants within society-was ambitious yet essential to shift from conflict to both engagement and coexistence in a shared society. The process did not end with the definitive decommissioning of both sides, rather it evolved from embedding non-violence to transforming societal and personal relations within Northern Ireland, moving a little farther down the long and winding road to reconciliation.
The Transformation of Loyalism in Northern Ireland: From Armed Struggle to

Engagement to Disarmament to Reintegration
On Good Friday, 10 April 1998, after 800 years of conflict on the island of Ireland, eighty years of partition, and thirty years of the Northern Irish "Troubles," in which over 3,600 people were killed, over 35,000 injured, 34,000 shootings and 14,000 bombings (in a population of only 1.7 million people), the official negotiations concluded with the Belfast or "Good Friday" Agreement (GFA). To be sure, the Good Friday Agreement did not solve all of Northern Ireland's conflict-related problems, and in the post-agreement decade, these organisations embarked on a long and difficult process of disarmament ("decommissioning"). In this context, the main task for combatant communities shifted from preventing spoilers to re-integrating former militants.
Keeping the combatant community on board while committing to a ceasefire, to peace negotiations, and finally to renunciation of armed struggle was pivotal in the Northern Ireland transition.
For both Republicans and Loyalists militants, their experience as fighters had taught them resentment and distrust towards their 'enemy,' thus, for them, the psychological leap from conflict to engagement was an especially hard one to make. More substantially, combatants, especially if on a full-time basis, can often have direct incentives to continue fighting, as it may provide their economic livelihood along with a sense of identity, belonging, and prestige.
For Loyalists, building consensus for the peace process began nearly 10 years before the agreement, when combatants themselves began challenging their organisation's use of force as an effective strategy. Loyalist leaders employed multiple strategies to gain buy-in from their members throughout the pre-and post-agreement phases. Some of the most prominent ones are reviewed here.
Internal and External Agents of Change: the Role of Ex-Prisoners and Key Faith Leaders as Combatants' "Critical
Friends"
Former Loyalist prisoners played, and continue to play, a key role in reformulating their organisations' strategies: when the first life-sentenced prisoners were released in Northern Ireland in 1989 and the early 1990s, they reflected on the personal and community price paid to sustain armed struggle, with the credibility and legitimacy "to ask questions and be heard" (Hoey 2010) . They re-entered their communities challenging the Loyalist ideology and its use of force, and publicly criticizing the British State, saying things like "I served 15 years to preserve the British state, and it was the British state that put me in prison. What does that say about our battle? About our political ideology?" These questions and focus on the human cost of the conflict within working class Loyalist communities "began to influence change" (Watters 2010 ).
In the years preceding the GFA, while Loyalists enforced their 1994 ceasefire and policy of 'restraint,' intra-group discussions focused increasingly on building support for engagement with the enemy. Ex-prisoners continued questioning the use of violence but in a more permanent way, asking whether it was "really helping to transform Loyalist communities." Such discussions gradually eroded "the old-school" ethos of other combatants in the community (Watters 2010 ).
In addition to these internal agents of change, there were about a dozen clergy members on the entire island who directly engaged militants and those committed to violence (Mason 2010) . Aiding the peace process from the outside, their contributions took the form of transferring messages as intermediaries, facilitating private meetings, and assisting "political groups to evaluate their strategies and goals" (McCartney 1999) . These roles continue even today.
The third function is most relevant to the process of consensus-building w i t h i n Loyalist militant groups. Beginning in the early 1990s, a few local Protestant clergies began serving as same-side proponents within Loyalism. For example, Reverends Roy Magee and Harold Good supported leading peace-making loyalists in their questioning of the philosophy and morality of violence" (Corry 2007: 9) .
Methodist Reverend Gary Mason, whom the UVF and RHC today consider a "critical friend," worked for 27 years in the inner city of Belfast and promoted urban, social, and economic development as a way to serve Loyalism by arguing, "we can do it better" (while most Protestant clergy chastised Loyalist combatants and former combatants) (Mason 2010) . Still today, Mason listens to combatants and excombatants, affirms their pain, and talks with them about accountability, forgiveness, and new beginnings.
He accompanies them in unfamiliar contexts where they are invited to share their stories or listen to others. He facilitates meaningful engagement both among Loyalists and with their traditional adversaries, such as other combatant groups, politicians, victim's groups, and security services.
The influence of critical friends like Mason is bolstered by their understanding that even a reverend or priest could have taken the path that the militants took, yet they are scrutinized for "talking to men of violence." In Mason's words: "I am well aware of the risks that one can be seen to be endorsing violence or at least giving violence credibility. But my role is one of engagement, not endorsement. I firmly believe that the person of faith in any religious tradition should be taking risks for peace that politicians simply can't take because of their political support base."
Because the positive contribution of former combatants is often unrecognized and excluded from the official 'peace process' story, the work of critical friendship is even more essential for affirming their dramatic journeys to peace.
Tools to build support for ceasefires and for entering peace negotiations (1992-8): Explanation, Reframing, Consultation
Throughout the 1990s Loyalist leaders were able to convince their members to observe a ceasefire and then to favour peace negotiations with the IRA by first explaining and reframing the enemy behaviour. This was possible due to the increased understanding that senior Loyalists, particularly exprisoners, had about the other side. Having been exposed to Republicans while incarcerated, these Loyalists were able to think analytically about the IRA and Sinn Fein, whereas most members viewed them as monolithic (Moloney 2010, 408) . Additionally, in the early and mid-1990s, clergy-facilitated backchannels as well as NGO-facilitated workshops and dialogues gave senior militants further insight into the internal dynamics of their enemies (White 2010; Reynolds 2010 ). They understood (or felt they understood) how the other side was functioning, and they used this information to keep their members on board by explaining and reframing the actions of their enemy.
For example, following the 1998 peace agreement, when Loyalists heard Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams' rhetoric flare up, UVF leaders explained to their members that such comments from Republican politicians were only meant "to keep their own people on board," stressing that people "shouldn't pay much attention" (Roberts 2010 ).
In addition to explaining negative gestures of their enemies, Loyalist leaders also reframed positive actions in order to sell the transition towards peace internally. For example, when the IRA finally declared its "cessation" of armed activities in August 1994, the Loyalist organisations framed it as "surrender" in order to justify their own subsequent ceasefire (Wilson 2010) . The perceived victory served to convince those members who were pessimistic about the IRA's intentions, as well as to maintain internal legitimacy. Page | 239 flexibility to move towards peace. Also use reframing as a face-saving tool to convince your own constituency that you are not abandoning your cause. In turn, this may allow both sides to frame the compromise as a 'victory' while also shifting strategy, without having to denounce the past.
• Promote grassroots ownership: Invest in direct communication and consultation with bases of support; actively seek to prepare people for peace. In doing so it is important to:
-Rely on internal" Agents of Change": Involve credible trust-worthy supporters like community leaders or former prisoners (where relevant); -Involve external "Critical Friends" to support militant groups in sustaining their transition to 'civilianisation' and to facilitate communication with other actors.
• Develop the Community around Combatants: Offer alternative roles and ways to demonstrate loyalty.
The process should focus on:
-Creating viable and sustainable re-integration programs that address former combatants' political identity, financial needs, and psychological well-being.
-"Decommission people's minds, not only their weapons" by providing combatants with non-violent social and community development approaches.
• Recognize that consensus-building for every step takes time: Consensus-building must be seen as continuous and dynamic processes (even 15 years' post-agreement), for implementation and beyond. The question should not just be how to sign an agreement, but also how to create conditions for negotiations and how to sustain that initial consensus for a peace agreement after it is signed. Thus, a longterm consensus-building strategy is needed.
While each of these points should be further developed and put into context, it is clear that peace-making in Northern Ireland represents an important and powerful legacy, as well as a cautious tale of hope with respect to managing and potentially resolving long-standing, embedded, and bitter internal conflicts.
Note: Interviews were conducted in June-August 2010 by Ariel Heifetz Knobel.
